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Speaking of a "Pacific Age" is now commonplace. About a hundred
years ago, however, it was almost a flight of fancy. In 1890, Manjiro
Inagaki, a Cambridge-educated Japanese diplomat, wrote: "Without doubt
the Pacific will in the coming century be the platform of commercial and
political enterprise. This truth, however, escapes the eyes of ninety-nine
out of a hundred, just as did the importance of Eastern Europe in 1790
and of Central Asia in 1857. " 1 Inagaki's belief was based on the seemingly
inevitable clash of interests between England and Russia in those years.
The rivalry for spheres of influence between the two "super powers"
extended from the Balkans to Central Asia/Afghanistan and was now, he
thought, extending to Eastern Asia and the Pacific. The "Pacific Question"
2
was, he maintained, an inevitable extension of the "Eastern Question. ,
Inagaki sought through his writings to arouse the interest of the
government and people of Great Britain about the importance of Japan.
While Vancouver, which was connected with the east coast of North
* Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo, and President of the Research
Institute for Peace and Security.
1. MANJIRO INAGAKI, JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC AND A JAPANESE VIEW OF THE
EASTERN QUESTION 21-22 (1890). Born in 1861 in Nagasaki, Inagaki studied in
Cambridge under the guidance of Professor John Robert Seeley. He was assigned to
Siam in March 1898 as charg6 d'affaires at the Japanese legation. There he served as
minister plenipotentiary from 1899 to 1905 (with a seven-month interval in 1903).
Inagaki then served as minister plenipotentiary in Spain from February 1907 until his
death on November 25, 1908.
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Id. at 10.

America by way of the Canadian Pacific Railway and further with the
British Isles across the Atlantic Ocean, provided Great Britain with an
outlet for the Pacific, the Siberian Railway and Vladivostock provided
Russia with an exit for the Pacific. Korea-"the Turkey" of Asia-was
becoming a bone of contention between Great Britain and Russia, which
might cause a second Crimean War in the Pacific instead of on the Black
Sea. Given these facts, Inagaki argued, Japan would be the key of the
Pacific since its navy would be able to sever communication between
Vancouver and British outposts in the Far East, such as Port Hamilton,
Shanghai and Hong Kong. Inagaki noted: "Port Hamilton is rather useless
with regard to the Japan Sea and the Canadian Pacific Railway road without
a Japanese alliance, but it would be of immense importance in
interests from the Yellow
withstanding a Russian attack on the British
3
Sea through Mongolia and Manchooria."
An Anglo-Japanese alliance, which would eventually come into being
in 1902, was not yet a foregone conclusion. In 1887, Great Britain
abandoned the Port Hamilton scheme in deference to Chinese concern.
Instead, it chose to obtain a written guarantee from China against any
future Russian occupation. 4 In other words, Great Britain's commercial
and diplomatic interests with China still far surpassed the possible merits
of its alliance with Japan. This is not the place, however, to bring the
story of Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relations to any further point.
Suffice it to say that Japan's victory over China, only five years after the
publication of Inagaki's book, significantly altered the contours of Far
Eastern international relations, as did Japan's British-aided victory over
Russia some ten years later. Inagaki's prediction as to the importance of
Japan for Great Britain's Asian diplomacy, and vice versa, was fulfilled.
Inagaki also correctly predicted the important place that the Pacific
was to occupy in 20th century international history. Inagaki's perception
was in large part due to the teachings of John Robert Seeley, his teacher
at Cambridge. A historian and renowned author of The Expansion of
England,5 Seeley taught Inagaki the way to get the right perspective on
international history. According to Seeley, "In the school of Carl Ritter
much has been said of three stages of civilization determined by
geographical conditions, the potamic which clings to rivers, the

3. Id. at 34.
4. In 1885, when Russia advanced its army to Afghanistan, Britain occupied Port
Hamilton (three small islands on the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula) in preparation
for a planned attack on Vladivostock. The scheme to make it a permanent naval base
was abandoned two years later.
JOHN R. SEELEY, THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND: Two COURSES OF LECTURES
5.
(2nd ed., 1899).
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6
thalassic, which grows up around inland seas, and lastly the oceanic.",
Substitution for the Mediterranean Sea by the Atlantic Ocean as the
highway of commerce represented a transition from the second (thalassic)
to the third (oceanic) stage of civilization. This new oceanic age was
ushered in with the explorations of Christopher Columbus and the two
sister nations on the Iberian Peninsula. At the time of Inagaki's writing,
the transcontinental railways across America and Eurasia, together with
the then ongoing scheme of the Panama Canal, were about to transform
the Pacific Ocean into a new highway for commerce. As Inagaki rightly
said, humankind was witnessing the arrival of a new era called "the
railway-oceanic." 7
Inagaki reminds us of Halford J. Mackinder, a British scholar of
geopolitics. Both Mackinder and Inagaki stressed the importance of the
Siberian railway, which made Russia a formidable rival for Great Britain
in the Far East. But it would be more appropriate to remember here the
name of Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy, a contemporary of
Inagaki. His famous book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History:
1660-1783, was first published in 1890, the same year in which Inagaki's
book was published in London. As a fervent advocate of a powerful
United States navy, Captain Mahan, like Inagaki, viewed the Pacific
Ocean as an important theater of competition among nations in the
coming century.
In forecasting the future, Mahan drew the reader's attention to, among
other signs of the times,

the development of... new commercial [centers], notably in China and Japan,
that was the most prominent feature,... and, . . . the stirring of the East, its
entrance into the field of Western interests, not merely as a passive something to
be impinged upon, but with a vitality of its own, formless yet, but significant,
6. Id. at 102. What Ritter and Seeley called "the thalassic" stage roughly corresponds
to Fernand Braudel's "coastal navigation." According to Braudel: "The sea in the sixteenth
century was an immensity of water: man's efforts had only conquered a few coastal
margins and tiny ports of call. Great stretches of the sea were as empty as the Sahara.
Shipping was active only along the coastline. Navigation in those days was a matter of
following the shore line, just as the earliest days of water transport, moving crab-wise
from rock to rock, from promontories to islands[,] and from islands to promontories."
FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE
OF PHILIP 11 103 (Sian Reynolds trans., University of California Press 1995).
7. INAGAKI, supra note 1, at 53.
8. Halford J. Mackinder, The GeographicalPivot of History, 23 THE GEOGRAPHICAL
JOURNAL No. 4 421-27 (1904) (paper read to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904).
Mackinder elaborated on the theme in HALFORD J. MACKINDER, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS
AND REALITY (Anthony J Pearce ed., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962) (1919).

inasmuch as where before there was torpor, if not death, now there is indisputable
movement and life. 9

Mahan did not necessarily foresee inevitable clashes of interests
between East and West, but he was naturally concerned about military
implications of "the stirring of the East" for America. It was apparently
China, not Japan, however, that aroused his anxiety. Referring to the
naval value of Hawaii, he wrote as follows:
There is one aspect of the recent revolution in Hawaii which seems to have been
kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the islands, not merely to our own
and to European countries, but to China. How vitally important that may
become in the future is evident from the great number of Chinese, relatively to
the whole population, now settled in the islands.
It is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the United States only,
whether the Sandwich Islands, with their geographical and military importance,
unrivalled by that of any other position in the North Pacific, shall in the future
be an outpost of European civilization, or of the comparative barbarism of
China. It is sufficiently known, but not, perhaps, generally noted in our country,
that many military men abroad, familiar with Eastern conditions and character,
look with apprehension towards the day when the vast mass of China-now
which have in past ages buried
inert-may yield to one of those impulses 10
civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion.

The truth of the matter is that the government of Japan, not that of
China, was protesting attempts by the U.S. government to annex Hawaii
by taking advantage of the island kingdom's 1893 revolution. According to
a survey in 1896, there were 24,407 Japanese settlers on the islands
(22.4 percent of the whole population of Hawaii) as compared to 21,616
Chinese (19.8 percent). Only four years later the number of the former
group reached 61,111 (about 40 percent of the total population), while
that of the latter group was 25,767.1 In 1893, Japan's Imperial Navy
dispatched a cruiser, the Naniwa, to Hawaii under the command of
Captain Togo Heihachiro, 12 ostensibly to protect lives and properties of
Japanese settlers on the islands. This move created a strained atmosphere in
Hawaii, as well as in diplomatic relations with Japan and the United
States. Fortunately, this problem was peacefully settled and did not
leave a lasting effect on U.S.-Japanese relations.
It might be the case that Captain Mahan overlooked the potential
strength of Japan, while being impressed rather excessively by the sheer
size of China. A victory for Japan against Russia in 1905 changed that
9. CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, THE INTEREST OF AMERICA INSEA POWER, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 234-35 (1897).

10.

Id. at31.

11.

SARUYA KANAME, HAWAI OUCHOU SAIGONO Jouou (THE LAST QUEEN OF THE

HAWAIIAN DYNASTY) 219-20 (2003).
12. The hero in the historic battle on the Sea of Japan with the Russian Baltic Fleet
in 1905.
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perception of Japan. Theodore Roosevelt was one of those American
politicians who, apparently influenced by Mahan, became aware of
Japan's potential power. He volunteered to act as the mediator for a
Russo-Japanese peace treaty, negotiations for which were held in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In 1905, when Roosevelt said that the
20th century would be that of the Pacific Ocean, a realist like him was
anticipating, even if only vaguely, an increasing rivalry with Japan. But
it was of course beyond his, or anybody else's capacity, to know in
advance exactly in what manner history would actually evolve.
Looking back now, about a hundred years after Theodore Roosevelt's
time, we know that international relations in the Pacific during the 20th
century were not really pacific. During the four decades between Theodore
Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, "the Pacific Question" was defined
more and more in terms of U.S.-Japan rivalry, not Anglo-Russian rivalry.
Those years witnessed a continuous aggravation of the relationship between
the two rising powers in the Pacific, culminating in the Pacific War.
Reflecting on these developments, the word "Pacific" gradually crept
into the vocabulary of Japanese diplomacy, although it never replaced
the term "Asia," which remained the most frequently used referent in
13
pre-World War II discourse in Japan about international relations.
Despite their insular character, Japanese people remained unfamiliar
with the Pacific Ocean throughout its long history. This was partly because
of Tokugawa's self-imposed seclusion policy, under which the building
of large vessels was strictly prohibited. Nature was another reason.
Japanese archipelagoes are surrounded by strong currents, which prevented
the inhabitants on the islands from launching out into the "great ocean,"
at least until modem times. Once awakened from the century-old seclusion
policy, Japan quickly tried to emulate Great Britain, the leading naval
power. The expansion of Japan, however, only partially resembled that
of England. On the whole, the pull from the Asiatic Continent was stronger
than that from the Pacific Ocean. The army prevailed over the navy; the
northern advance school (hokushin-ron) over the southern (nanshin-ron);
and the military approach over the commercial. It is symbolic that what
Japan called the Great East Asian War was the Pacific War for the
Americans.
13. This is based on a content analysis of the speeches of prime and foreign
ministers at the Diet, in Akio Watanabe, Taigai Ishiki Ni Okeru 'Senzen' To 'Sengo, 'in
KINDAI NIHON No TAIGAI-TAIDO (ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OUTSIDE WORLD OF MODERN

JAPAN) 225-74 (Sato Seizaburo & Roger Dingman eds., 1974).

It is only after 1945 that Japan began to feel a stronger pull from the
Ocean than that from the Asian continent, which was due in large part to
American policy. A possible combination of Japan's industrial potential
and China's great mass was a nightmare for the Cold Warriors of the United
States. That type of anxiety was particularly acute in the early years after
the April 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty by which Japan resumed its
diplomatic status. One of the policy papers prepared by a member of the
American Embassy in those years spoke of two competing forces pulling
Japan in opposite directions: continental and oceanic. Although suddenly
severed from the Asiatic continent, Japan remained very vulnerable to
the influence of continental Asia because of strong material and spiritual
ties. The implication for American policy was clear: 4Enhanced efforts
would be needed to tow Japan into the American orbit.'
Under the subtitle of the "continental pull," the paper stated:
There is a special quality in Japan's view of China and a gravitational pull
toward the mainland with its ties of culture, blood, tradition, personal
experience, and the recent memory of an earlier life. Variously rationalized,
this ends with "bridge theory" of Japan's mission between East and West. All
this, and much of it wells up from the deepest springs of Japanese
consciousness, [sic] appears to many Japanese to be served at least for the time
being by neutralism.

A similar logic propelled the Eisenhower Administration to reorient
U.S. policy towards Japan with a greater emphasis on its economic
rehabilitation in the international society. With the assistance of the
United States (and to some extent that of Canada as well), Japan was
admitted to such international economic organizations as the Colombo
Plan, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the International
Monetary Fund. This was a rather bitter pill to swallow for some U.S.
allies in Asia and the Pacific region. Countries such as Australia and
New Zealand felt betrayed by the wartime leader who, to their chagrin,
now tended to put Japan's economic interests before those of its former
allies.15 Washington's concern about a possible Japan and China alliance
was shared by London, which devoted its best efforts to persuade its
14. A Preliminary Reappraisal of United States Policy with Respect to Japan,
Embassy Study prepared by William Leonhart and submitted to Walter S. Robertson,
Assistant Secretary for State, on Oct. 25, 1954 (National Archives RG 611.94/10-2554),
at 28.
15. An earlier example was General Douglas MacArthur's Occupation policy to
restore Japan's fishery and whale industry, which aroused strong resentment from
Australia and New Zealand. The Tripartite International North Pacific Fisheries
Convention was, to those South Pacific nations, nothing but an arrangement to protect
interests of America and Canada at the expense of the other nations in the Asia and
Pacific region. This story is well told by HARRY N. SCHEIBER, INTER-ALLIED CONFLICTS
AND OCEAN LAW, 1945-53: THE OCCUPATION COMMAND'S REVIVAL OF JAPANESE
WHALING AND MARrINE FISHERIES (2001).
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Commonwealth members to follow suit as the United Kingdom endorsed
American policy with regard to Japan. In a diplomatic note handed down in
the middle of 1954, United Kingdom Government stated that it was
prepared
(a) to play its part in preventing the economic distress which might foster
Communism in Japan, by maintaining as high a level of trade between Japan
and the sterling area as is consistent with the national interest; [and]
(b) to take whatever opportunities occur to effect a change in the climate of
accord with
United Kingdom opinion towards Japan so as to bring it into closer
16
the overriding requirements of the national policy and interest.

Prompted by the British suggestions, Sir Robert Menzies's Cabinet
started to reassess its own Japan policy and ended up advising the
Australian people to "behave as a 'grown-up' nation which knows that
the greatest stumbling block to peace is the perpetuation of enmities. 17
The policy of Australia, as the paper argued, "should be guided by the
principle of allowing Japan, through cooperation with non-communist
nations, to have reasonable facilities by expanding her export trade, and
in a way
for developing her political and economic life and institutions
18
that will strengthen Japan's association with the West."'
Rational calculation is one thing, and political dynamics is another, be
it in Washington, London, or Canberra. As for Australia, it concluded a
commercial treaty with Japan in 1957, lifted a two-decade-old iron ore
embargo in 1959, and concluded a friendship treaty in 1976. But the
basic framework for Japan's entrance (or reentrance) into a web of
political and economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region had
been set up by the end of the 1950s. 19
The international landscape in the Asian and Pacific region showed
remarkable changes in the ensuing decades. Japan's high economic growth
during those years is a well-known story. Concurrent prosperity was
shared by most of the nations facing the Pacific Rim/Basin. In 1980, U.S.
transpacific trade (i.e. trade with Asia) began to soar past its transatlantic
trade (i.e. trade with Europe).2 ° Ohira Masayoshi, then Prime Minister
16. Record of Conversation with Mr. G.W. Tory, U.K. High Commissioner, 17th
June, 1954. Australian Archives ACT CRS A517 Item 46-1931 pt.XXI.
17. Australian Policy towards Japan, Submission No. 30, July 28, 1954.
18. Id.
19. See SAYURI SHIMIZU, CREATING PEOPLE OF PLENTY: THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES, 1950-1960 (2001).
20.

MARK BORTHWICK ET AL., PACIFIC CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN

PACIFIC ASIA 2 (1992).

of Japan, proposed the scheme for the Pacific Basin Cooperation, which
gave an impetus to establish the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference,
which held their first meeting in Canberra in September 1980.21 It may
be said that remarkable progress in communications and transport
technologies in modem times has transformed the vast Pacific Ocean
into virtually an inland sea.
The 20th century witnessed conflict and bloodshed between the two
emerging powers across the Pacific Ocean in its first half and then
economic prosperity-though not without conflict-among them in its
second half. It seems that, with the emerging power of China before the
turn of the century, the development of Pacific international relations is
entering a new phase. A group of plate tectonic experts tell us that the
Japanese archipelagoes have moved closer to the Chinese Continent on
average by 2.9 centimeters per annum. Commenting on this scientific
finding, a Japanese newspaper wrote: "This means that Japan is moving
away from the American Continent by that distance. 22 More seriously,
Japan's export to China increased by 32 percent in 2002, whereas its
export to the United States grew by only one percent. As a result, the
U.S. accounted for 28.5 percent of Japan's export, while China for 9.6
percent (or 15.7 percent if Hong Kong is included), in 2002. Moreover,
Japan's import from China surpassed that from the United States for the
first time in 2002 (Y7,725 billion for China and Y7,217 billion for
America).23
Do these changes foretell that the Asiatic Continent has begun to give
Japan a stronger pull than the Pacific Ocean? Or is it that the entire
region of Asia and the Pacific will become closer, embracing America
and Asia together, in the new century? "The Bridge Theory" of Japan's
mission between East and West will be critically tested on the stage of
Pacific theater in the new, 21 st century.

21. The Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, Report on the Pacific Basin
CooperationConcept (May 19, 1980).
22. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 1992.
23. NIHON KEizAI SH-IMBUN, Jan. 27, 2003 (evening), and Jan. 28, 2003.

